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Drawing conclusions from the literature regarding the moral development of people with 
intellectual disabilities (IDs) is difficult because of the use of unstandardised and 
idiosyncratic measures. In order to address this short-coming, a moral reasoning 
production measure (the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form; SRM-SF) and a 
recognition measure (the Moral Theme Inventory; MTI) were presented to men with and 
without IDs who had no known history of engaging in illegal behaviour.  The instruments 
were completed on two occasions, separated by a two week interval, in order to 
investigate their basic psychometric properties.  The results indicated that there was a 
strong relationship between the MTI and the SRM-SF, suggesting that the MTI has 
convergent validity.  The internal consistency of the MTI and the SRM-SF ranged from 
moderate to substantial for both men with and without IDs.  However, the test-retest 
reliability of the MTI was poor for men with IDs, while it was good for men without IDs.  
The test-retest reliability of the SRM-SF was good for both men with and without IDs.  
Comparison of the moral reasoning abilities of men with and without IDs suggested that 
many of the differences between the two groups could be accounted for by general 
intellectual functioning.  The exception was overall score on the SRM-SF and moral 
reasoning in relation to the law, where men with IDs scored at stage 2(1), when 
intelligence was controlled.   The results were interpreted by suggesting that the 
relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour may take an inverted U curve 
shape, moderated by intelligence.  
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The psychometric properties of the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure – Short Form and 
the Moral Theme Inventory for men with and without intellectual disabilities.  
 
1.0 Introduction 
Following the early work of Piaget (1932) on the moral development of children, 
Kohlberg (1969, 1976) revised Piagetian perspectives, to incorporate the moral 
development that occurs in adolescence and adulthood.  He proposed a stage theory of 
moral development that extended beyond childhood and into adolescence and adulthood. 
The theory originally comprised six stages, spread across three levels, and formed a 
hierarchical stage model where more complex levels of moral reasoning required 
successful progression through earlier stages in a more or less linear fashion.  The 
progression in moral reasoning was accompanied by a parallel developmental progression 
in logical reasoning.   However, Kohlbergian moral development theory has been widely 
criticised (Gilligan, 1982; Schweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977) and has subsequently been 
revised into a sociomoral stage theory (Gibbs, 1979, 2003, 2010).  Gibbs (1979) removed  
post-conventional moral reasoning from Kohlbergian theory arguing that such mature 
levels were “existential”, citing evidence that post-conventional moral reasoning is 
achieved infrequently across cultures.  Gibbs and his colleagues (1979; Gibbs, Basinger, 
& Fuller, 1992) proposed a sociomoral stage theory (Table 1) regarding the reasons or 
justifications people give for their behaviour, and these revisions have been shown to 
have cross-cultural validity (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).  However, 
Kohlbergian and Gibbian approaches to moral development are nested within the 
cognitive developmental domain, and others have adopted alternative theoretical 
approaches to moral development, nested within the social domain (Semetana, 1999; 




Turiel, 1983, 2002) or the emotional domain (Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Staub, 1989; 
Hoffman, 2000).  
INSERT Table 1 About Here 
 
While there are shared commonalities between differing theoretical approaches to 
moral development, none has actively considered the moral development of people with 
intellectual disabilities (IDs).  Langdon et al. (in press-a) reviewed the literature relating 
to the moral development of people with IDs, and concluded that the moral development 
of children, adolescents and adults with IDs appears to be similar to that of their typically 
developing peers, but occurs in a slower manner.  However, the differences in the rate of 
development between people with IDs and typically developing individuals may 
disappear when cognitive ability is controlled.  However, Langdon et al. (in press-a) 
suggested that any conclusions must be tenuous because, first, existing studies have not 
considered the impact of  language ability and performance on measures of moral 
reasoning and, secondly, many of the moral reasoning measures used within the studies 
are idiosyncratic and unstandardised.   
 
Langdon et al. (in press-a; in press-c) went on to discuss the methods that are 
traditionally used to measure moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning measures are generally 
classed into two types, a) recognition, and b) production instruments.  Recognition 
instruments involve the presentation of a set of moral justifications to people preceded by 
the presentation of a moral dilemma.  Respondents are asked to choose justifications 
which best match their own moral reasoning about the dilemma.  Production instruments 




are different because participants are asked to verbalise their own reasoning in response 
to questions which follow the reading of a moral dilemma.  Langdon et al. (in press-a) 
suggested that, since people with IDs may have communication difficulties, recognition 
instruments may have greater utility with this population, because they may be easier to 
understand.   However, many recognition instruments do not measure the 
developmentally younger stages of moral reasoning (Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, 
& Bebeau, 1999) and their validity is questionable, because in contrast to production 
instruments, they often do not discriminate reliably between offender and non-offender 
participants. (Basinger & Gibbs, 1987; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gibbs et al., 
1984; Stams et al., 2006).   
 
Considering this measurement problem further, Langdon et al. (in press-a) also 
suggested that the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure- Short Form (SRM-SF) may be used 
with people with IDs, but concluded that further research was required.  The SRM-SF is a 
measure that is linked to Gibb’s Cognitive-Developmental Model of Sociomoral 
Reasoning (Gibbs, 2003, 2010).  As Langdon et al., (in press-a) point out, this measure 
has been successfully used with young children (Gibbs et al., 2007), and no reading or 
writing is required if the instrument is presented as part of an interview.   However, as yet 
there is no evidence that recognition or production instruments can be reliably used to 
assess the moral reasoning abilities of people with IDs.  
 
As a consequence of the issues raised by Langdon et al. (in press-a; in press-b), 
the aims of this study were twofold.  First, the study sought to examine the psychometric 




properties of a production and recognition instrument of moral reasoning in relation to 
men with and without IDs.  Secondly, the study aimed to compare the moral reasoning 
abilities of men with and without IDs using both forms of measurement, controlling for 
language ability or intelligence.  Men with and without IDs were recruited from the 
community in the Eastern region of the United Kingdom and completed a battery of 
assessment measures in a single session.  Two weeks later, the participants completed the 
measures of moral reasoning again so that the test-retest reliability of the instruments 
could be examined.  Assuming that recognition instruments should be easier to 
understand, it was hypothesised, compared to the production measure (the Socio-Moral 
Reflection Measure – Short Form), the recognition measure (the Moral Theme Inventory) 
would possess superior psychometric properties when used with men with IDs. It was 
also hypothesised that men with IDs would have developmentally earlier moral reasoning 
abilities, and differences from men without IDs would be partially accounted for by 




Thirty two men (M age=45.88, SD=15.01; M Full Scale IQ=59.35, SD=6.16) 
were recruited from services for people with IDs in the eastern region of the United 
Kingdom and formed the IDs Group.   Twenty-eight men (M age=40.64, SD=10.41; M 
Full Scale IQ=102.29, SD=8.05) without IDs were also recruited from community 
sources and formed the Comparison Group.   All of the participants included in this study 
reported that they were of white British ethnic origin.   All of the participants with IDs 




had attended a special school for people with intellectual or other developmental 
disabilities, and were now using adult intellectual disability services.    
 
The specific inclusion criteria were: a) all participants should be men because 
there is some evidence that men and women make moral judgements differently 
(Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, 1984; Walker, 1995), b) the Full 
Scale IQ of participants with IDs should be less than 70, with associated difficulties with 
adaptive behaviour (considered to be present if the person was receiving support from 
specialist services for health and social care), and these difficulties having an onset before 
the age of 18 (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and c) the Full Scale IQ of 
participants without IDs should be greater than 70, and there should be no associated 
difficulties with adaptive behaviour.   Adaptive behaviour difficulties were assumed to be 
absent if the person was employed and was not receiving support from specialist services.   
Participants were excluded if they had a known history of criminal charges, cautions or 
convictions or they were currently subject to criminal justice proceedings, including 
ongoing criminal investigations.  The exclusion of these participants was based on the 
relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, 
& Dodd, 1990; Stams et al., 2006) amongst young offenders.  Finally, participants with 
IDs were excluded if they were judged to lack the capacity to provide consent to take part 
in this research. 
 
2.1.1Attrition. There was some attrition associated with the current study.  
Among the IDs Group, four participants withdrew from the study at differing points 




during the assessment process, and one further participant was withdrawn by the 
researcher because he appeared overly anxious while completing some of the material.  
Of the four participants who withdrew, one telephoned the researcher and left a message 
stating that he no longer wanted to take part.  Another stated that he did not want to take 
part further because of competing activities at his day centre.  When asked if he would 
like to rearrange, he declined.  The two other participants asked to stop once the 
assessment had begun and no longer wanted to take part.   
 
Among the Comparison Group, none of the participants withdrew from the study, 
or were withdrawn by the researcher.   However, one participant did not return some of 
the questionnaires, and reminders did not result in the return of his data; another 
participant did not return one questionnaire, and again, reminders did not result in its 
return.   
 
2.2 Design and Procedure 
Two groups of participants (Group: IDs or Comparison) were recruited and 
completed a set of measures at one time point, and then completed some of the measures 
again, following a two-week interval.   This two week time interval allowed for the 
examination of the test-retest reliability of the moral reasoning instruments.  
 
Following a favourable ethical opinion from the Suffolk NHS Research Ethics 
Committee, information about the project was disseminated to men with IDs by 
distributing a poster and a leaflet to intellectual disabilities services in the eastern region 




of the United Kingdom.  Managers of day services and community learning disabilities 
teams were contacted directly, and informed of the project.  They were asked to distribute 
information leaflets to men with IDs using their services.   They were specifically 
directed not to share information regarding the study with anyone using their service 
whom they knew to have a history of engaging in illegal behaviour.  Any man who 
expressed an interest in taking part was asked to alert his key-worker, who then informed 
the manager.  The manager then contacted the researcher to inform him of the number of 
possible participants at a site, and a mutually convenient time was arranged to attend the 
site and speak to potential participants. Once someone indicated that he might like to take 
part, full information about the study was provided, and he was asked to provide signed 
consent.     
 
Information about the study was disseminated to the Comparison Group in several 
different ways.  Leaflets and information sheets were distributed by their managers to 
men employed within a university in a non-academic position.  Information about the 
study was also disseminated using an advertisement email system at this university.  
Participants were asked not to volunteer for the study if they had a history of engaging in 
illegal behaviour.  Interested participants were invited to contact the researcher directly, 
and signed consent was given by those who wished to take part.  
 
All participants were interviewed on two occasions.  During the first meeting, all 
were asked whether or not they had a history of police arrest or caution, or a criminal 
conviction, or if they were part of an ongoing trial or police investigation as a defendant 




or suspect.  Any participant who disclosed such a history was not recruited into the 
current study.  
 
Initially, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - IIIUK (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 
1998) was administered to assess the general intellectual functioning of participants, 
while the spoken language portion of the Test of Adolescent and Adult Language Fourth 
Edition (TOAL-4; Hammill, Brown, Larsen, & Wiederholt, 2007) was used to assess the 
spoken language of participants.  A measure to assess socio-economic status was also 
presented.  Measures of socially desirable responding and two measures of moral 
reasoning were presented in a randomised order.   For the IDs Group, the assessment 
material was presented orally.  In order to determine test-restest reliability, the measures 
of moral reasoning were presented following a two-week interval.  The measures of 
socially desirable responding were also administered a second time for a similar purpose, 
but this was part of another study (Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, in press-b).  All 




2.3.1 General Intellectual Functioning. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - 
IIIUK (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1998) was used to assess the general intellectual functioning 
of participants.  The WAIS-III is a well developed reliable and valid measure of general 
intelligence that has been standardised on a British population.  Reliability coefficients 
for the WAIS-III IQ scales range from 0.88 to 0.97 (Tulskey, Zhu, & Ledbetter, 1997).   




The WAIS-III yields three different IQ scores.  These are called the Verbal IQ, 
Performance IQ and Full Scale IQ.  Verbal IQ reflects acquired knowledge, verbal 
reasoning and comprehension of information presented within the verbal domain.  
Performance IQ reflects non-verbal reasoning, visual-spatial processing, attentiveness to 
detail and visual-motor integration.  Full Scale IQ is an aggregate of the Verbal and 
Performance IQ scores and represents global intellectual functioning.  
 
2.3.2 Spoken Language. The Test of Adolescent and Adult Language Fourth 
Edition (TOAL-4; Hammill et al., 2007) was used to assess the spoken language of 
participants.   The TOAL-4 is a standardised reliable and valid assessment of spoken and 
written language which assesses semantics, grammar and graphology.    It comprises six 
subtests: three of which assess spoken language and three which assess written language.   
For the purposes of this study, there was no need to administer the written language 
subtests because expressive language was of most interest and more likely to be related to 
moral reasoning scores, especially in relation to production measures.    Additionally, 
many of the items associated with the written language subtests are complex and require 
writing, and would be difficult for people with IDs to complete.   
 
The three spoken language subtests administered were Word Opposites, Word 
Derivations, and Spoken Analogies.  During Word Opposites, the respondent is asked to 
say an opposite word to the word spoken by the examiner, while Word Deviations asks 
the respondent to change a given word so that it is said correctly at the end of a sentence.  
Spoken Analogies involves the examiner giving the respondent an analogous sentence 




which needs to be completed.  Scaled scores from the three subtests combine to form an 
Index of Spoken Language ability.  
 
Test-retest reliability for the TOAL-4 has been reported to range from 0.83 to 0.97 
(Hammill et al., 2007) and the test is considered to possess content validity, criterion-
prediction validity, and construct-identification validity (Hammill et al., 2007).  The 
measure has been shown to assess language abilities accurately in a number of groups 
(Hammill et al., 2007). 
 
2.3.3 Socio-Economic Status. Measures used as part of the Department for Work 
and Pensions’ Families and Children Study (FACS; Department for Work and Pensions, 
2002) were considered because they have subjected to a secondary analysis examining  
the socio-economic position of families with children and adolescents with IDs (Emerson 
& Hatton, 2007).   Within the original FACS study, socioeconomic status and social 
capital were assessed across areas such as household income, material and social 
hardship, household occupation, and debt and savings (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2002; Emerson & Hatton, 2007).  
 
However, the purpose of the current study was not to replicate the findings of the 
FACS study, and not all the areas that were assessed as part of the original study were 
relevant.   Given that the current study included adults with IDs, many of whom were 
living in supported or residential accommodation and not employed, examining 
household income and household occupation was problematic.  Additionally, trying to 




gain access to information relating to debt and savings for participants was ethically 
problematic.   
 
Nevertheless, one of the aspects that formed part of the FACS study that could be 
feasibly used, was not overly intrusive, and appeared likely to return useable data, was 
material and social hardship.  This construct was assessed by a short questionnaire (the 
Hardship and Deprivation Scale; HDS) comprising twenty-eight items that aims to 
examine what a person would like to buy but is unable to afford, across several domains, 
including food, clothing, material possessions, and social activities.   A total score is 
calculated by dividing the number of items that the person cannot afford by the sum of 
the number of items that he currently has and those he cannot afford, ignoring the number 
of items that he neither wants nor needs (e.g. toys and sports gear for children).   The total 
score ranges from 0 to 100, with higher scores reflecting higher material and social 
hardship, or lower socio-economic status.  
 
There are no validity or reliability data relating to the Hardship and Deprivation 
Scale (HDS).   However, Emerson and Hatton (2007) used this questionnaire within their 
study examining poverty and socio-economic status within families where there is a child 
or an adolescent with IDs.  Their demonstrated that 31% of the relationship between child 
health and IDs can be explained by socio-economic factors, suggesting that the 
questionnaire may be valid for the assessment of aspects of socio-economic status.   
 
2.3.4 Social Desirability. This was used in addition to the assessment of moral 
reasoning, as there may be a relationship between moral reasoning and social desirability 




for two reasons, 1) participants may distort their responses in an attempt to present 
themselves in a favourable manner or 2) those endorsing a virtuous viewpoint, may, as a 
consequence, score higher on a measure of social desirability.   Langdon et al. (in press-
b) revised the Self- and Other-Deception Questionnaires, creating the Self- and Other-
Deception Questionnaires – Intellectual Disabilities (SDQ-ID and ODQ-ID) in order to 
examine the psychometric properties of these instruments for the sample of participants 
included within the current study.  The results indicated that the instruments had 
moderate to substantial internal consistency and moderate to excellent test-retest 
reliability in both groups of men with and without IDs.  Langdon et al., (in press-b) also 
demonstrated that differences between men with and without IDs on the SDQ-IQ and the 
ODQ-ID could be accounted for by differences in intelligence.  
 
2.3.5 The Moral Theme Inventory.  The Moral Theme Inventory (MTI; 
Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999) is a recognition measure of moral 
reasoning.  The measure was primarily developed for use with children, but has also been 
used with populations of adults.   Respondents are asked to consider four moral stories 
which have a moral message, and these are presented by playing a digital audio file to 
each participant.  After this, respondents are asked to engage in a series of tasks to assess 
their moral reasoning (Table 2).    
________________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
 




The first task examines whether or not the respondent has understood the moral 
story, while the remaining tasks assess his or her moral reasoning.  Performance across 
the Vignette Rating and Choice, and the Message Rating and Choice tasks are adjusted by 
subtracting the rating for incorrect answers from the rating for correct answers.  Scores 
are then combined into a Composite Score by adding the total score across the Vignette 
and Message tasks.  Higher scores represent developmentally more mature moral 
reasoning; however, in contrast with some measures of moral reasoning, the score does 
not directly relate to a theoretical moral stage.  
 
The MTI appears promising for use with people who have IDs because it 
considers developmentally younger moral reasoning, and the moral stories are recorded 
and played to participants, rather than having to be read by them.  The internal 
consistency of the Comprehension task and the Composite Score has been reported to be 
good (Narvaez et al., 1999), and the MTI differentiates between children of differing ages 
and adults (Narvaez et al., 1999).  
 
However, the MTI is lengthy and was originally designed to be presented over 
two sessions.  This was potentially problematic for the current study because participants 
were already being asked to complete a large amount of test material. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the reliability and validity of the MTI is not affected if only two 
stories are used, rather than the original four (Narvaez & Bock, 2001).  Consequently, it 
was decided to present only two of the four moral stories.    
 




Unfortunately, the content of the moral stories is not culturally appropriate for use 
within the United Kingdom.  The MTI was developed in the United States, and each of 
the four stories reflect life there.   The four moral stories are titled, a) California, b) 
Malcolm, c) Jed, and d) Kim.  Each title is the name of the main character within each 
story.  The first two stories were not used in the current study because there is some 
evidence that validity and reliability are not compromised by using only the Jed and Kim 
stories (Narvaez & Bock, 2001).   The Jed story is about a boy who was left to care for 
his baby sister, but invited to play American football with his friends.  Some of the 
language is not used within the United Kingdom (e.g. diapers, sidewalks, strollers) and 
revision was required.   The Kim story presents a family who are travelling from Detroit 
to Minneapolis in search of employment.  Again, much of the language is not used within 
the United Kingdom (e.g. freeways, baloney sandwiches, cents and dollars), and so also 
required revision.  
 
The author of the MTI gave permission to revise the moral stories to reflect UK 
culture.  Revisions were shared with the original author of the MTI.  American language 
was removed and replaced with British words (e.g. catching a football was changed to 
kicking a football).  Names of cities in the United States (e.g Detroit) were replaced with 
British cities (e.g. Liverpool). No alterations, however, were made to the moral theme of 
each story. New audio recordings were then prepared using a British English speaker. 
 
2.3.6 The Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form.  The Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure (SRM-SF) is a production measure of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 




1992) and has been shown to possess high levels of test-retest reliability (r=0.88; Gibbs et 
al., 1992), and excellent internal consistency (k=0.92; Gibbs et al., 1992).  The SRM-SF 
appears valid as it is correlated with the Moral Judgement Interview, and discriminates 
between children of differing ages, as well as between ‘delinquent’ and ‘non-delinquent’ 
adolescents (Gibbs et al., 1992).   
 
The SRM-SF comprises eleven questions, and generally takes about twenty 
minutes to administer.  The questions relate to the following seven constructs, a) Contract 
(questions one to three), b) Truth (question four), c) Affiliation (questions five and six), 
d) Life (questions seven and eight), e) Property (question nine), f) Law (question ten), 
and g) Legal Justice (question eleven).  Each question is relatively brief, and invites the 
respondent first to consider the importance of behaving in a certain manner, or making a 
certain decision, within the context of a forced choice.  For example, when asked the 
question, “Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours.  How important 
is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to their friends?”, the respondent is asked to 
choose whether this is very important, important, or not important.   Next,  respondents 
are asked to consider further by answering the following question, “Why is that very 
important / important / not important?”.  Respondents write their answers on the 
questionnaire, or give them orally to be recorded by the interviewer.  All answers from 
the IDs Group were recorded by the interviewer.  
 
Verbatim answers are scored according to a set of complex rules and heuristics, 
and the development of proficient and reliable scoring occurs through the use of practice 




scoring material (Gibbs et al., 1992).  Responses to each question are assigned a 
developmental rating which corresponds to a moral stage associated with Gibb’s Socio-
Moral Reasoning Theory.  At least seven of the eleven questions must be answered with 
scorable material in order for a questionnaire to be reliably scored.  Once a 
developmental rating is assigned to each question, it is converted to a number (e.g. a 
developmental rating of 1 corresponds to moral stage 1, and is assigned the numerical 
value 1). Scores across all the questions are then summed and the mean is calculated and 
multiplied by 100, yielding a possible score of 100 to 400.  As shown in Table 2, these 
scores correspond to a person’s global moral stage.   Additionally, moral stage ratings can 
be generated for the seven constructs examined by the SRM-SF: a) Contract, b) Truth, c) 
Affiliation, d) Life, e) Property, f) Law, and g) Justice.  The scores generated across these 
constructs are interpreted using Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
 
Since there are no known reliability data regarding the SRM-SF or the MTI for men with 
IDs, the test-retest reliability and the internal consistency of these measures were 
examined within the current study.   The inter-rater reliability of the scoring of the SRM-
SF was also calculated using an expert rater who scored a random sample of 14% (n=15) 
of completed questionnaires. 
 
2.4 Data Preparation and Analysis  




All data were entered and analysed using PASW Statistics Version 18.0.2.  
Descriptive data were generated and examined, and any possible errors were checked and 
corrected as appropriate.   Data were inspected for departures from normality by visual 
inspection of histograms and the generation of P-P plots.  No variables departed 
substantially from normality with the exception of the TOAL-4 Spoken Language Index, 
the HDS, the Comprehension section of the MTI, and the seven constructs assessed using 
the SRM-SF; however, the overall SRM-SF score was not affected.    Non-parametric 
statistics were use for analyses relating to the HDS and the Comprehension section of the 
MTI.   
The statistical analyses were planned and allowed for the effective investigation 
of the hypotheses.  Initially, the IDs Group and the Comparison Group were compared on 
basic descriptive data relating to age, IQ, socioeconomic status and language. Following 
this, the psychometric properties of the moral reasoning measures were examined at both 
Time 1 and Time 2.  Internal consistency was determined by calculating a Cronbach’s 
alpha, and two-week test-retest reliability was determined by calculating the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (single measure reliability). Results were interpreted according to 
the recommendations of Landis and Koch (1977), Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981) and 
McDowell (2006). 
 
The relationships between measures of moral reasoning and social desirability, 
socioeconomic status, age and intelligence and language ability were examined by 
calculating Pearson correlation coefficients (two tailed) or in relation to the HDS and 
Spoken Language, Spearman correlation coefficients (two tailed), using Time 1 data 




only.  Full Scale IQ and Spoken Language were entered as covariates in further analyses. 
A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) and analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVA), controlling for spoken language ability or intelligence were used with 
bootstrapping; sampling 5000 times with replacement.  Bootstrapping is a powerful 
alternative to parametric statistics and generates robust estimates of standard error and 
confidence intervals.  Using ANOVA and ANCOVA, parameters were estimated and bias 
corrected and accelerated (BCa) 95% confidence intervals were generated and reported 
regarding any differences between the groups.  In reporting our statistics, the statistic 
reported is based on the original data, while the significance level is derived using 
bootstrapping.  We also report the BCa confidence interval; if this does not include zero, 
then differences are statistically significant (p<0.05).  These analyses only included data 
collected at Time 1.  There were three reasons for this decision: a) the Time 2 data were 
only included within the study to examine the test-retest reliability of the MTI and the 
SRM-SF, b) the SRM-SF can be successfully scored when participants have provided 
scorable answers to at least seven of the questions.  Unscorable answers should be treated 
as missing data, and as a consequence, participants with missing data are excluded from 
more complex statistical analyses (e.g. MANOVA) that included the factor Time, thus 
reducing the sample size, and c) there was no significant difference across Time in 
relation to the MTI (t(52)=1.15, p=0.25;  BCa 95% CI=-1.17 to 4.46), or the SRM-SF 
(t(52)=-1.86, p=0.07; BCa 95% CI=-10.10 to -0.015).   
 
3.0 Results 




There were no significant differences between the groups in terms of age 
(t(57)=1.48, p=0.14; BCa 95% CI=-1.79 to 11.78), while the Comparison Group had a 
significantly higher Full Scale IQ (t(57)=41.37, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-46.43 to -39.25), 
Verbal IQ (t(57)=38.10, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-42.05 to -34.06), and Performance IQ 
(t(57)=41.37, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-45.33 to -37.28) as well as a significantly higher 
Spoken Language score (t(57)=12.61, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-44.80 to -32.19).  The IDs 
Group scored significantly higher on the Hardship and Deprivation Scale (z=5.10, 
p<0.001) indicating that they were of significantly lower socioeconomic status.  They 
also scored significantly higher on the ODQ-ID (t(57)=5.76, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=3.72 
to 7.74) and the SDQ-ID (t(57)=3.43, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=1.73 to 5.08) indicating 
higher levels of social desirability (Table 4).  
 
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
 
3.1 Psychometric Properties: The Moral Theme Inventory.  The internal 
consistency of the Vignette Rating Task and the Message Rating Task within the Moral 
Theme Inventory was examined.  The internal consistency of the other tasks associated 
with this instrument was not examined because the data generated are associated with a 
single choice, rather than multiple choices across items. 
 
For the IDs Group, the internal consistency of the Vignette Rating Score was 
substantial at Time 1 (k=0.80) and excellent at Time 2 (k=0.81); the internal consistency 




of the Message Rating Score at Time 1 (k=0.81) and Time 2 (k=0.84; Table 4) was also 
excellent for the IDs Group.  The internal consistency of the Vignette Rating Score at 
Time 1 was moderate (k=0.46), while at Time 2 it was substantial (k=0.76) for the 
Comparison Group.  The internal consistency of the Message Rating Score was excellent 
at Time 1 (k=0.81) and substantial at Time 2 (k=0.80).  Combining both groups, the 
internal consistency of the Vignette Rating Score at Time 1 (k=0.67) and Time 2 (k=0.76) 
was substantial.  Turning to the test-retest reliability for the MTI, this was poor (ri=0.20) 
for the IDs Group, but it was good (ri=0.70) for the Comparison Group.  Combining the 
two groups indicated excellent (ri =0.81) test-retest reliability (Table 4).  
 
There are no known validity data relating to the MTI.  Correlations between the 
MTI and the SRM-SF, a well-established measure of moral reasoning, were calculated 
combining both groups of participants.  At both Time 1 (r(55)=0.73, p<0.001) and Time 2 
(r(53)=0.83, p<0.001), there was a significant positive correlation between the MTI and 
the SRM-SF, indicating that the MTI has convergent validity with respect to the 
assessment of moral reasoning.  
 
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
 
3.2 Psychometric Properties: Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form.  
The SRM-SF had substantial internal consistency at Time 1 (k=0.79) and at Time 2 
(k=0.67; Table 4) for the IDs Group, while the Comparison Group had substantial 




internal consistency at both Time 1 (k=0.77) and Time 2 (0.78).  The test-retest reliability 
of the SRM-SF for the IDs Group was good (ri=0.74), and was also good (ri=0.78) for the 
Comparison Group.  Combining both groups revealed that the internal consistency of the 
SRM-SF at Time 1 (k=0.95) and Time 2 (k=0.96) was excellent, as was the test-retest 
reliability of SRM-SF (ri=0.96; Table 4).   The inter-rater reliability of the SRM-SF was 
also examined with respect to both the total score.  The results indicated excellent 
agreement between raters with respect to total score (ri=0.98).   
 
3.3 Correlations.  The relationship between variables was explored further by 
examining the correlation coefficients (two-tailed) between variables for the IDs Group 
and the Comparison Group separately using Time 1 data only.  This was carried out to 
determine which variables would be most appropriate to act as covariates in further 
analyses.  Amongst the IDs Group, there was a significant positive correlation between 
SRM-SF scores at Time 1 and Full Scale IQ (r(28)=0.44, p=0.018) and spoken language 
ability (r(28)=0.53, p=0.003).  However, there were no significant relationships between 
SRM-SF scores at Time 1 and age (r(28)=-0.05, p=0.81), socioeconomic status (r(28)=-
0.08, p=0.69), the ODQ-ID (r(28)=0.26, p=0.19), or the SDQ-ID (r=-0.20, p=0.32).  
There was no significant relationship between MTI scores and age (r(28)=-0.09, p=0.63), 
Full Scale IQ (r(28)=0.18, p=0.36), socioeconomic status (r(28)=-0.08, p=0.67), or social 
desirability as measured by the ODQ-ID (r(28)=-0.16, p=0.43) and SDQ-ID (r(28)=-0.12, 
p=0.56).  However, there was a significant positive relationship between scores on the 
MTI at Time 1 and spoken language ability (r(28)=0.40, p=0.036).   
 




Examining the relationships between these variables amongst the Comparison 
Group, there was a significant positive correlation between SRM-SF scores and Full 
Scale IQ (r(27)=0.44, p=0.036) and spoken language ability (r(27)=0.41, p=0.034).  
There was no significant relationship between SRM-SF scores and age (r(27)=-0.05, 
p=0.79) or socioeconomic status (r(27)=-0.07, p=0.73).  There was a significant 
relationship between social desirability, as measured by the ODQ-ID (r(27)=0.51, 
p=0.006)  and the SRM-SF.  There was no relationship between the SRM-SF and the 
SDQ-ID (r(27)=0.18, p=0.37).   There were significant positive relationships between 
MTI scores and age (r(28)=-0.49, p=0.009), Full Scale IQ (r(28)=0.61, p=0.001), and 
spoken language ability (r(28)=0.44, p=0.024).  In contrast, there were no significant 
relationships between MTI scores and socioeconomic status (r(28)=-0.09, p=0.64) or 
social desirability as measured by the ODQ-ID (r(28)=-0.19, p=0.325) and SDQ-ID 
(r(28)=-0.19, p=0.340).  
 
It was apparent that there was an inconsistent, or absent relationship, between 
moral reasoning scores and age, socioeconomic status and social desirability across both 
groups.  As a consequence, these variables were not included as covariates in further 
analyses.  Full Scale IQ was related to moral reasoning scores in both groups of men, 
although MTI scores did not relate to IQ amongst the IDs Group.  Spoken language 
ability was related to moral reasoning scores in both groups.   Therefore, it was decided 
to undertake an initial analysis without controlling for any variables, followed by an 
analysis controlling for language, and finally, an analysis controlling for intelligence. 
 




3.4 Moral Reasoning Abilities.  Initially, the moral reasoning abilities of the two 
groups were compared without including covariates in the analysis.   On the SRM-SF, the 
IDs Group scored significantly lower than the Comparison Group on Contract (F(1, 
54)=75.21, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-130.40 to -84.80), Truth (F(1, 52)=68.29, p<0.001; 
BCa 95% CI=-146.80 to -88.80), Affiliation (F(1, 54)=93.51; BCa 95% CI=-118.81 to -
80.20), Life (F(1, 54)=80.73, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-130.10 to -82.30), Property (F(1, 
50)=69.51, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-175.00 to -108.50), Law (F(1, 51)=179.02, p<0.001; 
BCa 95% CI=-228.20 to -167.80), Legal Justice (F(1, 48)=137.86, p<0.001; BCa 95% 
CI=-189.70 to -136.10), and Total Score (F(1, 54)=225.20; BCa 95% CI=-136.14 to -
105.99; Table 4).  Overall, the SRM-SF mean score for the IDs Group fell at Stage 2, 
while it fell at Stage 3 for the Comparison Group (Table 4). 
 
On the MTI, the IDs Group scored significantly lower than the Comparison Group 
on the Comprehension task (z=-6.11, p<0.001) indicating that men with IDs had some 
difficulty understanding and recalling information about the moral stories.  The IDs 
Group also scored significantly lower on the Vignette Rating task (F(1, 55)=42.82, 
p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-11.90 to -6.33) indicating that they had some difficulty 
recognising the similarity between four short vignettes and the main story with respect to 
their moral theme.  The IDs Group also had more difficultly recognising the short 
vignette that actually matched the main moral story (2(2)=12.46, p=0.002).  On the 
Message Rating task, the IDs Group had a significantly lower score (F(1, 55)=43.49, 
p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-15.63 to -8.40), indicating that they were less able to recognise 
the moral message within the moral story.  There were similar findings for the Message 




Choice task, where the IDs Group had greater difficulty choosing two messages that 
matched the moral message within the moral story (2(4)=35.91, p<0.001).  Overall, the 
IDs Group scored significantly lower than the Comparison Group with regard to Total 
Composite Score on the MTI (F(1, 55)=83.50, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-28.74 to -18.40; 
Table 4).  
 
When this analysis was completed, controlling for spoken language ability, the 
results did not change.  The IDs Group still scored significantly lower than the 
Comparison Group on Contract (F(1, 54)=9.36, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-114.00 to -
41.10), Truth (F(1, 52)=8.38, p=0.003; BCa 95% CI=-138.30 to -35.90); Affiliation (F(1, 
54)=7.19, p=0.025; BCa 95% CI=-93.60 to -10.90), Life (F(1, 54)=11.29, p<0.001; BCa 
95% CI=-114.40 to -36.70), Property (F(1, 50)=14.21, p=0.001; BCa 95% CI=-201.30 to 
-70.50), Law (F(1, 51)=27.69, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-248.20 to -126.80), and Legal 
Justice (F(1, 48)=28.44, p=0.001; BCa 95% CI=-219.60 to -86.50).   When spoken 
language was controlled, the significant difference between the Groups on the Total 
SRM-SF Score (F(1, 54)=35.69, p<0.001; BCa 95% CI=-124.61 to -63.84; Figure 1) 
remained.   
 
When spoken language was controlled, a significant difference between the 
Groups on the Vignette Rating Task (F(1, 55)=4.86, p=0.012; BCa 95% CI=-10.13 to -
0.96) of the MTI remained, while the Message Rating task (F(1, 55)=2.46, p=0.21; BCa 
95% CI=-14.74 to 1.62) was no longer significantly different.  However, overall the 




significant difference between the two groups on the MTI Composite Score (F(1, 
55)=6.72, p=0.012; BCa 95% CI=-23.59 to -3.80) remained. 
 
When Full Scale IQ was controlled, there was no significant difference between 
the Groups on the SRM-SF on six constructs, Contract (F(1, 54)=<1, p=0.303; BCa 95% 
CI=-126.10 to 16.50 ), Truth (F(1, 52)=1.05, p=0.196; BCa 95% CI=-136.00 to 14.90), 
Affiliation (F(1, 54)=<1, p=0.994; BCa 95% CI=-65.30 to 66.90), Life (F(1, 54)=<1, 
p=0.272; BCa 95% CI=-84.00 to 27.80), Property (F(1, 50)=1.16, p=0.216; BCa 95% 
CI=-157.50 to 47.50), and Legal Justice (F(1, 48)=<1, p=0.459; BCa 95% CI=-110.40 to 
31.00).  However, the IDs Group scored significantly lower than the Comparison Group 
on Law (F(1, 51)=9,48, p=0.001; BCa 95% CI=-252.90 to -91.80).  In relation to the Law 
construct, moral reasoning for the IDs Group fell at Transition Stage 2(1), while for the 
Comparison Group it fell near Transition Stage 3(4) when IQ was controlled (Figure 1).   
However, the difference between the Groups on the Total SRM-SF score was just 
significant (F(1, 54)=2.86, p=0.05; BCa 95% CI=-93.10 to -8.88) when Full Scale IQ was 
controlled.  
 
When Full Scale IQ was controlled, there was no significant difference between 
the two groups on the Vignette Rating task (F(1, 55)=<1, p=0.582; BCa 95% CI=-5.35 to 
10.79), or Message Rating task (F(1, 55)=<1, p=0.873; BCa 95% CI=-12.54 to 11.89 ) of 
the MTI.  This was also the case in relation to the MTI Composite Score (F(1, 55)=<1, 
p=0.768; BCa 95% CI=-12.67 to 14.52).  
 





The aim of this study was to examine the basic psychometric properties of a 
recognition (the MTI) and production (the SRM-SF) measure of moral reasoning used 
with a sample of men with IDs.  It was predicted that the MTI would have superior 
psychometric properties in comparison to the SRM-SF.  It was also predicted that men 
with IDs would have developmentally younger moral reasoning abilities than the 
Comparison Group, and that this difference would partially be accounted for by spoken 
language ability, and fully accounted for by intelligence.   
 
The results demonstrated that the SRM-SF had satisfactory psychometric 
properties in relation to men with and without IDs, but, unexpectedly, there are some 
difficulties with the MTI.  Although there was a substantial relationship between the MTI 
and the SRM-SF, suggesting that the MTI is a valid assessment of moral reasoning 
ability, the test-retest reliability of the MTI for the group of men with IDs was poor.  This 
finding is likely to reflect the complexity of the tasks and the demands it made on 
working memory.  Participants were asked to listen to a moral story, answer a set of 
questions, understand four more short stories and compare these to the original moral 
story. They then had to review a set of moral justifications, again bearing in mind the 
content of the original moral story.   Men with IDs scored significantly lower on the MTI 
Comprehension Task suggesting that they had difficulties even understanding and 
recalling details from the main moral story.  It was noted during the interviews that the 
men with IDs seemed to be struggling to understand the tasks associated with the MTI, 
and as a consequence, some of them may have simply been guessing their subsequent 




answers.   This undermines the suggestion by Langdon et al. (in press-a, in press-c) that 
recognition instruments may be more appropriate for people with IDs, although it remains 
the case that, if simpler recognition instruments were available, they could be useful.  The 
findings indicated that the SRM-SF appears to be a promising instrument for use with 
people with IDs.  While its use appeared relatively straightforward, it was noted that 
some men with IDs found the question, “How important is it for a person to live, even if 
that person doesn’t want to?” difficult to understand.  Some repetition of the questions 
was required in order to encourage participants with IDs to produce sufficiently scorable 
speech.  However, all of the men with IDs provided scorable answers to at least seven of 
the eleven questions.  This meant that no questionnaires were rejected as unscorable.    
 
In contrast with much of the literature (Langdon et al. in press-a), this study used 
a well developed production and recognition measure of moral reasoning.  This means it 
is possible to generate some meaningful information about the moral reasoning of men 
with IDs.  Men with IDs were generally reasoning at Global Stage 2, and in contrast, men 
without IDs were generally reasoning at Global Stage 3.  However, inconsistent with our 
prediction, the differences between the two groups were not accounted for when spoken 
language was controlled, except for the Message Rating Task on the MTI.  These results 
suggest that differences between men with and without IDs on the SRM-SF cannot be 
accounted for by spoken language ability, while some of the differences on the MTI can 
be accounted for by differences in spoken language ability.  However, the differences 
between the two groups were also not completely accounted for by intelligence; 
differences remained regarding the moral justifications given with regard to obeying the 




law, and the overall difference between the two groups remained significant.  At first 
glance, this is puzzling because lower moral reasoning tends to be associated with illegal 
behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Stams et al., 2006), but yet none of the participants in this study 
had a known history of illegal behaviour.  Young people who do not engage in illegal 
behaviour have moral reasoning in relation to law and legal justice that tends to fall at 
Stage 3, while their ‘delinquent’ counterparts tend to use moral reasoning that falls at 
Stage 2 (Blasi, 1980; Campagna & Harter, 1975; Gavaghan et al., 1983; Gregg, Gibbs, & 
Basinger, 1994; Stams et al., 2006; Trevethan & Walker, 1989). In the current study, the 
men with IDs had no known history of illegal behaviour, but still had less well developed 
moral reasoning abilities.     
 
The explanation may lie in the moral justifications given by men with IDs in 
relation to the law.  In the current study, scores for these justifications fell within Moral 
Stage 1, and more specifically at the Transition Stage 2(1).  This remained the case even 
when spoken language or intellectual functioning were controlled.  Reasoning at this 
stage is associated with making justifications based on unilateral authority and rules.  
Some supportive evidence for this suggestion was generated by Richards, Bear, Stewart 
and Norman (1992) who noted that, in typically developing children, the relationship 
between moral reasoning and behaviour may be curvilinear, so that the earlier and later 
moral reasoning stages are associated with fewer behavioural problems.  Langdon et al., 
(in press-c) also suggested that the relationship between moral reasoning and illegal 
behaviour may be curvilinear, moderated by intellectual ability.   The implication is that 
men with IDs whose moral reasoning about the law is at a developmentally younger stage 




may tend to avoid illegal behaviour, because it is ‘against the rules’, while those who 
have moral reasoning about the law that falls within Stage 2, will be more likely to have 
“borderline” intellectual abilities and may therefore be at “risk” of engaging in illegal 
behaviour.   Illegal behaviour should be less prevalent among men of average intellectual 
ability whose moral reasoning is also developmentally older. Our findings appear 
consistent with such a model, but since we did not include any men with a history of 
illegal behaviour in the present study, we could not test it.  
 
The main strength of the current study is that it allows for some conclusions to be 
drawn about the advantages of a production instrument, the SRM-SF, for the assessment 
of moral reasoning in men with IDs.  However, there were difficulties with unscorable 
responses on the SRM-SF, meaning that the factor Time had to be excluded from the 
analysis.  We could have limited the effect of this loss of participants from the 
multivariate analyses if we had used a much larger sample.  
 
While the current study addresses some of the concerns we have raised about the 
literature on moral reasoning (Langon et al., in press-b), much remains uncertain. For 
example, we know very little about the longitudinal moral development of children, 
adolescents and adults with IDs.  Only one previous study (Mahaney & Stephens, 1974), 
which unfortunately had some methodological problems,  has attempted to investigate 
this issue.   With some limited exceptions (Moore & Stephens, 1974; Sigman, Ungerer, & 
Russell, 1983), we also know very little about how, among people with IDs, moral 
development relates to behaviour. Further investigation is needed into the possibility that 




the relationship between moral development and illegal behaviour may approximate an 
inverted U shape, moderated by intelligence (Langdon et al., in press-a).  Nevertheless, 
since the SRM-SF appears to have satisfactory psychometric properties when used with 
men with IDs, it is now possible to make use of this measure within such research 
studies, though some further investigation of the psychometric properties of this measure 
using both men and women, and adolescents with IDs would be appropriate. It should, 
though, be borne in mind that the SRM-SF is linked to a specific cognitive-
developmental model of moral development (Gibbs, 2003, 2010). There are other  
theoretical approaches to moral development, such as the social domain theory 
(Semetana, 1999; Turiel, 1983, 2002), and moral reasoning theory where emotion is 
given a pivotal role (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Hoffman, 2000).  These theoretical 
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 Gibbs’ Sociomoral Stage Theory (Gibbs et al., 1992) 
 
Level and Stage Description 
Level 1: Immature 
Stage 1: Unilateral and Physicalistic 
 
Moral justifications are based upon unilateral 
authority and rule based, or related to punitive 
consequences of the violation of rules.    
Stage 2: Exchanging and Instrumental Moral justifications based upon an understanding 
that has arisen from social interaction.   For 
example, decisions to help others may be justified 
because that person may help you in the future.  
However, justifications remain superficial. 
Level 2: Mature 
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
 
Moral justifications are characterised by further 
decentration, and are based upon a prosocial 
understanding of emotional states (e.g. empathy), 
care and good conduct.   
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
 
Further maturity is indexed by the development of 
an understanding of the complex social structures in 
which we live.  Justifications are also based upon 
constructs such as rights, values and character 
within society.  Other justifications may be based 
upon social justice and responsibility or conscience.    
 





Description of the tasks that form the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI).  These tasks were 
completed following the presentation of a moral story.  
Task Description 
1. Comprehension Respondents are presented with ten true 
or false questions which aim to examine 
their understanding of the moral story. 
Questions are presented which cover 
factual information about the dilemma, 
and inferences that would have to be 
made from the story.  
2. Vignette Rating Respondents are asked to consider four 
short vignettes and consider whether or 
not the moral message of each vignette 
is similar to the previously presented 
moral story. Responses are scored on a 
5-point Likert scale.  Each of the four 
vignettes were devised such that only 
one vignette matched the previously 
presented moral story in terms of moral 
message, while the remaining three 
vignettes matched the previously 
presented moral story only by having the 
same characters, actions or setting.  
3. Vignette Choice Respondents are asked to choose one of 
the four vignettes which best matches 
the previously presented moral story. 
Frequency data is generated which 
ranges from 0 to 2, which indicates the 
number of correct choices.  
4. Message Rating  Respondents are asked to rate a series of 
moral messages according to how well 
each message matches the original moral 
theme of the story. Ratings are made 
along a 5-point Likert scale.  
5. Message Choice Respondents are asked to choose two 
previously rated moral messages that 
they think best matches the theme of the 
moral story.  Frequency data is 
generated which ranges from 0 to 4 
which indicate the number of correct 
choices.  






The relationship between scores on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form 
(SRM-SF) and moral stages.  
Score Moral Stage 
100 to 125 Stage 1 
126 to 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 to 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 to 225  Stage 2 
226 to 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 to 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 to 325 Stage 3 
326 to 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 to 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 to 400 Stage 4 
 
 







Descriptive statistics relating to men with and without IDs.  
 
Note. aVignette choice is a frequency count of the number of times a participant correctly chooses the vignette that correctly matches 
the previously presented moral story in terms of moral theme.  Two moral stories were presented to participants, so each participant 
chose a vignette twice. Therefore, the maximum correct frequency count for a participant is 2.  
bMessage choice is a frequency count of the number of times a participant correctly chose the moral message associated with the 
moral stories. Two moral stories were presented to each participant, and for each moral story there are two correct moral messages.  
Therefore, the maximum correct frequency count for a participant is 4. 
 Men with IDs Men without IDs 
 M SD M SD 
Full Scale IQ 59.35*** 6.16 102.29 8.05 
Verbal IQ 61.65*** 6.21 99.75 8.83 
Performance IQ 63.81*** 6.27 105.18 9.36 
Spoken Language 52.91*** 7.13 91.68 15.32 
Age 45.88 15.01 40.64 10.41 
Socioeconmic 
Status (HDS) 25.00*** 12.83 6.64 11.73 
Self-Deception 8.97*** 4.15 5.54 2.46 
Other-Deception 11.28*** 4.80 5.50 3.03 
Sociomoral 
Reflection 
Measure     
Contract 222.32*** 56.02 329.32 31.72 
Truth 201.79*** 56.90 319.60 45.41 
Affliation 215.71*** 45.62 314.81 27.96 
Life 208.93*** 46.75 315.74 41.11 
Property 158.93*** 54.52 302.17 68.22 
Law 151.80*** 31.86 352.08 71.44 
Legal Justice 166.67*** 43.85 331.82 54.65 
Total Score 199.89*** 32.88 338.24 48.51 
Moral Theme 
Inventory      
Comprehension 14.46*** 2.43 19.14 1.07 
Vignette Rating 1.11*** 5.37 10.17 5.00 
Message Rating  4.70*** 6.43 16.73 7.20 
Total Score 8.16*** 8.27 31.73 10.86 
 Frequency Frequency 
Vignette Choicea Zero One Two Zero One Two 
 12 10 6 2 9 17 
 Frequency Frequency 
Message Choiceb Zero One Two Three Four Zero One Two Three Four 
 2 12 11 2 1 0 0 3 14 11 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
    






Psychometric properties of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure –Short Form and the 
Moral Theme Inventory for men with and without intellectual disabilities 
 
 













Internal Consistency α= α = α = α = α = α = 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure 




0.67 0.77 0.78 0.95 0.96 
Moral Theme Inventory        
Vignette Rating Score 0.80  0.81 0.46 0.78 0.67 0.76 
Message Rating Score 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81 
       
Test-Retest Reliability ri= ri= ri= 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure 
– Short Form 
 
0.74 0.78 0.96 
Moral Theme Inventory  0.20 0.70 0.81 
Running head: MORAL REASONING AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 
 
42 
42 
 
 
 
